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fregat222

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Весь контент fregat222

  1. Я все же склоняюсь, что это специальный проект именно по удару по Европе. Слишком много пазлов об этом говорит
  2. Тут, тут и тут
  3. Ну, голодать Вы точно не будете, но стоит задуматься все равно о ситуации. В нынешней ситуации многие думают о координальных изменениях и своей профессии, и своей жизни, и вообще места проживания. Сужу по обращениям/вопросам и консультациям на данную тематику.
  4. И... Что случилось с этими людьми в дальнейшем. Я, например, лично знаю людей, которые умерли именно от пневмонии и от осложнений, вызванных гриппом. И таких около десятка. То, что умрем все - не вызывает сомнения. Но, уверен, не от этой непонятной болезни. Примерно, по такой же схеме действовали, когда предложили сериал "Слуга народа". И что мы на сегодняшний день имеем? Это вопрос риторический. Не нужно на него отвечать.
  5. Вот только вести из Китая уже оптимистичные, т.к. уже вовсю пишут, что все пошло на спад. Смотрите сами И ещё. Вспомните правила психологической накачки. Если постоянно говорить, что человек собака, то через некоторое время сам залает. А тут такое идет. Вообщем, думаю обычная, вернее необычная, а агрессированная манипуляция сознанием.
  6. Я еще могу рассказать, что твориться в самом Китае и, как информация, которую людям подают, ОЧЕНЬ (!!!!!!!!!!) сильно расходиться с реальным положением. 12.000 заболевших от обычного (но жесткого) гриппа/пневмонии. Посмотрите возраст заболевших и, самое главное, умерших. Вы что гриппом не болели? Или у Ваших знакомых из-за определенных обстоятельств не было осложнений? Уверен на 100%, что были. А теперь картиночка, которая много объяснит и успокоит. Кстати информация из Китая, так сказать из первых рук человека, который около 20 лет там живет. И рассказывает, что и как власти Китая преподносят. И как дают информацию о заболевших. А эту статистику именно власти Китая дают. Кстати ВОЗ в качестве транша на борьбу с этим вирусом выделил весьма хорошие средства. Ну и другим государствам досталось весьма неплохо. Плюс истерия и паника внутри самих государств. А когда паника способствовала принятию нормальных и взвешенных решений. Думаю, многие помнят призыв: "Прошу не создавать панику" или что-то подобное. Почему так? Уверен, что Вы сами ответите на этот вопрос. Ну помните, что современная медицина практически на 80 % обычный бизнес. Или я не прав?
  7. Почему бизнес-проект попытаюсь объяснить на пальцах. Короче, следите за руками. Но сначала вопрос. У кого из Ваших близких, близких близких, знакомы, знакомых знакомых, знакомых знакомых знакомых были зафиксированы указанные выше болезни? У меня в силу работы и коммуникабельности (думаю около 1.000 людей ) ни у кого этого нет и близко. Естественно - моим руки, едим чеснок/лук и т.д. НО, ни у кого ничего и близко не было. Но зато паника у человек 300 была (я имею виду птичий и свиной стейк грипп). И.естественно, траты хорошие на лекарства, продукты питания и т.д. Теперь по сути, США и Китай играют в одну игру против ЕС, т.к. именно после Брекзита появились сообщения об эпидемии (вспомните планету Шилезяку из "Тайны третьей планеты"). После Брекзита ЕС не досчитались ОЧЕНЬ много денег, т.к. Британия помахала ручкой. Потом эта пандемия, когда компании государств ЕС, расположенные в Китае стали сбрасывать акции. Там, вроде, на всем этом порядка 140-160 млрд "вечнозеленых президентов" они потеряли. Неплохая потеря от Брекзита (там конечно не 140 млрд, но все же тоже весьма ощутимо для ЕС) и КАРЕНОвируса. Догадайтесь, кто купил эти акции. Намекаю глаза у покупателей очень сильно узкие. В Давосе из-за этого Китаю был даже один день посвящен. Но те, только мило улыбались и разводили руками. Продолжаем далее - некоторые забыли, наверное, что основными паровозами ЕС есть 2 государства. Надеюсь, все помнят какие. А теперь вспомните провалы по финансам. "Дизельгейт", который до сих пор не закончился для ФРГ, ведь Фолькс очень много платит налогов в казну. А тут их недополучили. Теперь по Франции, а именно по компании Рено, которая входит в концерн Рено-Ниссан. Многие не обратили внимание на бегство Карла Гона перед НГ в чемодане (а мог бы и на ковре-самолете), а зря. В этой связке контрольный пакет акций у Рено, а все основные разработки Ниссановские. А контрольный пакет акций (почти полный) у самой Рено...у государства. Топ-менеджер свалил в Ливию. Рекомендую посмотреть и...подумать кто стоял за вывозом товарища, который топил за разрыв союза Рено-Ниссан. Ну и что бы случилось с акциями Рено, после такого "расторжения брака". И очень нравиться угрозы США в отношения Китая, особенно Хуавея, которые все время откладываются. Наталкивают на определенные мысли. Я могу еще далее продолжить. США и ЕС ведут полномасштабную финансовую войну. Пока выигрывает США. Поэтому и ситуация с этим вирусом поставит на колени ЕС, а не США и Китай.Так что как говорят "ничего личного, а только бизнес".
  8. У меня все сильнее уверенность, что вся эта возня с КАРЕНО/КАРОНО/КАРАНА/КАРИНАвирусом - чисто бизнеспроект. И опять же, как птичий и свиной грипп пришел из Китая. Вспоминаю, как Тимошенко бежала в Борисполь встречать самолет с терафлю.
  9. И не только в Канаде. В Британии наш сотрудник ОЧЕНЬ себя неплохо чувствует с такой профессией. Уехал, правда, еще в 2001 году по статусу беженца.
  10. А если придет время и нужно подтереться? Это же не мусульмане, использующие воду и только ее. И газет нет. А смартфоном (в качестве газеты) плохо пользоваться в данном ракурсе.
  11. В связи с тем, что ТС не может либо не хочет предоставить ни одного доказательства работы с указанной выше иммиграционной компанией (договора, инвойсы, чеки и т.д) и того, что он что-то кому-то платил, а так же переписку, то считается что все обвинения голословны. Поэтому прошу прекратить на данном форуме пиарить данную компанию. Это связанно со спецификой данного форума и основной деятельностью собственников форума. Любые дальнейшие сообщения, которые хоть как-то будут пиарить компанию либо упоминать о ней будут удаляться без возможности восстановления. Авторы будут получать предупреждения, а в особо сложных случаях непонимания баны. Надеюсь я все понятно всем разъяснил.
  12. Court strikes down immigration hurdles for foreign tech workers In a win for big tech companies, a judge has ruled that onerous requirements the Trump administration has placed on H-1B visa holders are "irrational" and "invalid." U.S. companies that employ highly skilled foreign workers scored a major victory on Tuesday, as a U.S. District Court judge in Washington struck down a set of onerous requirements that the Trump administration has been imposing on H-1B visa applicants since 2018. The requirements, which include forcing applicants to show exactly what projects they'd work on over a three-year time period, led to a dramatic surge in visa denials since 2016. The decision came in a case called ITServe Alliance v. Francis Cissna, which pitted an industry association for IT firms against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. But the court's ruling wasn't just a win for the IT outsourcing industry. Given that companies like Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook are among the top H-1B employers in America, it was a win for big tech — and the foreign workers they employ — too. "A decision like this has been long overdue," ITServe's national president, Amar Varada, said in a statement. "We finally have the judicial system agreeing with the employers that USCIS has been out of bounds for a long time." In a statement, USCIS told Protocol, "USCIS is currently reviewing the court's decision, and we have no additional comment to provide at this time." At issue in the case was a 2018 policy memo that USCIS published, implementing new rules for adjudicating H-1B applications. Since the 1990s, when the H-1B visa was first created, applicants had to prove to USCIS that they actually had a job offer from a U.S. employer by providing an offer letter, contract or an itinerary detailing where they were going to work and when. But the 2018 memo said that applicants would now need to explain exactly what assignments they'd be working on at exactly what times throughout the entire three-year period, a change that led to a swift uptick in visa denials, and in some cases, visas that were approved for as little as one day of work. Some H-1B visa holders who had been working in the United States for years and were on track for legal permanent resident status found their visas suddenly denied, starting a countdown clock before they and their families would be forced to leave the country. In her decision, Senior U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer wrote that this change was "irrational." Collyer, who was nominated to the bench by former President George W. Bush, said the memo not only contradicts statutes passed by Congress related to H-1B visas, but amounts to an official agency rule that never went through a formal rule-making process, and was therefore, invalid. "t would effectively destroy a long-standing business resource without congressional action," Collyer wrote. None of this is to say that the H-1B visa program is otherwise perfect. A recent survey run by OneZero found that H-1B visa workers "report feeling like an underclass, with stressful working conditions and discrimination due to their visa status." Meanwhile, stories have emerged over the years of corporations like Disney firing American workers and forcing them to train their lower-paid, H-1B replacements. The court's decision doesn't fix the problems with the H-1B visa program. But it does eliminate one of the newer hurdles interrupting both workers' lives and the operations of the companies that hire them. The court ordered USCIS to reopen the nearly 100 applications in the case and adjudicate them within 60 days, without subjecting them to these new requirements. "On one hand I'm not surprised in the least by the court's decision," said Jonathan Wasden, an attorney with Wasden Banias, who represented the ITServe Alliance. "On the other hand, it's still fun." Wasden has also filed a series of lawsuits over what he argues are unreasonable delays in the adjudication of H-4 visas for the spouses of H-1B visa holders, which Protocol has covered in depth. USCIS now has 30 days to appeal the court's decision. For Wasden, that would be a welcome outcome. USCIS' own officer training guidelines regarding how to interpret case law state that "typically, U.S. District Court decisions are not binding on other courts or on you." Wasden said that means the agency may well disregard this decision as it pertains to cases outside of Washington. A circuit court of appeals ruling, on the other hand, could compel the administration to end this practice, not just in D.C., but across the country. "It would be a birthday present to me if they appeal," Wasden said. The District Court opinion alone is still an important step. And in the near future, he said, if companies or workers run into similar visa issues, they now know that if they bring a case in Washington, they "have a pretty sure shot of winning." Источник
  13. Как модератор данного форума, прошу ТС, в подтверждении своих слов, предоставить доказательства отношений с данной компанией и отказы в визах. Если ВОЗМОЖНО (именно возможно), прошу предоставить подтверждение оплаты их услуг (хотя бы часть). Данные ТС можно удалить. Это существенно повлияет на отношение к словам ТС. Прошу не воспринимать мои слова ни в коем случае, как угрозу или попытку потроллить ТС. Отнюдь. Любая иммиграция (и я об этом не одну сотню раз говорил) в первую очередь юридический процесс и если, лицензированная компания, допускает, как пишет ТС, такие промахи, то желательно видеть доказательства, т.к. сам форум относится к публичным и подобные обвинений, как и возражения на слова ТС, должны быть аргументированы. В противном случае это либо обычная пиар-акция самой указанной выше компании либо просто гряз из уст конкурентной компании. И еще один важный момент. Это форум принадлежит определенным людям, которые являются лицензированными иммиграционными адвокатами в Канаде. Поэтому на основании Правил форуму либо урегулируйте вопросы рекламы себя как иммиграционных адвокатов в собственниками форума (чтобы не возникало конфликта интересов) либо воздержитесь от таких действий. Никого пугать я не хочу, но нужно быть до конца честными и порядочными. Одобрение на данное сообщение и на все последующие действия я только что получил от собственников данного форума. С уважением ко всем без исключения участникам форума, ваш fregat222
  14. Результатом этого может быть 2. Либо наградят либо убьют
  15. Два последних форумчанина, несмотря на мои просьбы проигнорировали последние. Бан на месяц с запретом писать любые сообщения. Форум не место для словесных перепалок и выяснения отношений. Во всяком случае этот форум.
  16. Двое уже получили предупреждение. Далее будет бан. Продолжаем посмотреть.
  17. Эксклюзив: новая кампания надеется завершить австралийские визовые баталии для людей с ограниченными возможностями На этой неделе в Аделаиде соберутся лучшие юристы, эксперты по миграции и защитники прав инвалидов, чтобы призвать правительство Австралии пересмотреть свои требования в отношении здоровья мигрантов, которые, по их словам, дискриминируют людей с ограниченными возможностями. Новозеландец Николь Форбс-Худ и двое ее несовершеннолетних детей юридически слепы, поэтому она была шокирована, когда ее 16-летний сын Кэмерон был единственным, чье заявление на постоянное проживание в Австралии было отклонено после того, как правительство не выполнило требование по миграции. Для Департамента иммиграции решение сводилось к тому, что у Кэмерон также есть аутизм и умственная отсталость, которые, по его словам, будут слишком дорогими для австралийского налогоплательщика. «Это было чрезвычайно разрушительным и непостижимым во многих отношениях», - сказала г-жа Форбс-Худ в интервью SBS News в тот момент, когда она получила отказ Кэмерон в 2015 году. «Я была шокирована и разбита горем, что они могут принять одного ребенка, а не другого». Семья из четырех человек переехала в Брисбен несколькими годами ранее в 2009 году и считала, что процесс получения гражданства Австралии будет «простым» из-за соглашений между двумя странами и потому, что дедушка детей был гражданином Австралии. «Мы действительно хотели лучшие возможности для нашей семьи, теплой погоды и австралийского образа жизни», - сказала 42-летняя г-жа Форбс-Худ. «Мы быстро устроились на работу, построили дом, и дети процветали. Мы жили австралийской мечтой ». Но требование по миграции для австралийских виз помешало этому. Требование здоровья относится к правилу, согласно которому люди, подающие заявление на визу или постоянное проживание, должны быть свободны от инвалидности или болезней, которые «могут потребовать медицинских или общественных услуг» и привести к затратам на сумму более 49 000 долларов США в течение 10 лет или на срок их пребывания при подаче заявления на временные визы. Это означает, что нескольким семьям и отдельным лицам каждый год запрещается мигрировать в Австралию исключительно на основании их инвалидности или хронического состояния здоровья, даже если нет никаких признаков того, что государственные службы по инвалидности или медицинские услуги будут использоваться. Г-жа Форбс-Худ делится историей своей семьи в рамках возобновленного толчка к пересмотру требований к миграции, более чем через 10 лет после того, как совместный парламентский обзор обнаружил, что она «несправедливо дискриминирует тех, кто имеет инвалидность». Кампания « Приветствуя инвалидов» , проводимая адвокатами по инвалидности, юристами и экспертами по вопросам миграции, призывает к пересмотру правительственного доклада 2010 года «Возможность Австралии» и немедленного выполнения рекомендаций. Официально стартуя в Аделаиде в четверг, организаторы кампании, которую поддерживают Австралийский синдром Дауна и Австралийские юристы за права человека, говорят, что они надеются, что она даст новый свет «несправедливому» и «несправедливому» процессу. «Прошло 10 лет с тех пор, как доклад« Включая Австралию »о миграционном лечении людей с ограниченными возможностями был передан правительству… но очень мало было сделано», - сказал Ян Готард, миграционный агент Estrin Saul Migration Lawyers, специализирующийся на проблемах инвалидности. запуска. «Последовательные правительства упустили это из виду, и мы считаем, что пришло время привлечь правительство к ответственности… потому что люди все еще сильно страдают из-за требований к миграции». Исполнительный директор Австралийского синдрома Дауна Эллен Складзин, которая также поддерживает кампанию, заявила, что потребность в здоровье - это «проблема прав человека». «Идея о том, что наше правительство просит людей, отвечающих всем остальным требованиям для получения визы, не въезжать в Австралию исключительно из-за того, что у них есть ребенок с синдромом Дауна, просто несправедлива и противоречит всем, за что мы выступаем, с точки зрения прав людей. с ограниченными возможностями », - сказала она. «Эти законы усиливают стигму и дискриминацию, с которыми уже сталкиваются инвалиды». Требование здоровья мигрантов преследует три цели: защитить население от рисков для здоровья населения, таких как инфекционные заболевания, предотвратить невозможность доступа австралийцев к медицинским услугам по требованию, таким как пересадка, и защититься от значительных расходов на здравоохранение. Министерство внутренних дел утверждает, что законодательство не является дискриминационным, поскольку оно в равной степени относится ко всем заявителям на получение визы и вида на жительство. Представитель департамента сказал SBS News, что со всеми заявителями обращаются «одинаково и справедливо». «Ни действующая, ни предыдущая политика не являются дискриминационными по отношению к заявителям, имеющим инвалидность или заболевание», - сказали они, добавив, что заявители, не отвечающие законодательным требованиям, могут подать заявку на вмешательство министров. Д-р Готард указывает на тот факт, что правила Закона о миграции освобождены от Закона о дискриминации инвалидов. «Если это не является дискриминационным, то почему его нужно исключить из Закона о дискриминации инвалидов? Это либо одно, либо другое, вы не можете иметь это в обоих направлениях », - сказала она. В 2018 году Кэмерон получил австралийское гражданство после того, как тогдашний министр иммиграции Питер Даттон вмешался в дело семьи. Это последовало за долгой и дорогой борьбой с апелляциями, которая заняла почти два года и обошлась семье более чем в 20 000 долларов. «Это было просто утомительно, - сказала г-жа Форбс-Худ. «Я просто не хочу видеть других в такой же ситуации… То, что у кого-то есть инвалидность, не означает, что он не может внести свой вклад в общество». Источник
  18. How refugees succeed in visa reviews: new research reveals the factors that matter Asylum seekers with legal representation are seven times more likely to succeed before the government tribunal tasked with reviewing refugee cases than those who represent themselves. Where refugees come from and which individual member is reviewing their case on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) may also significantly influence their odds of success. These are some of the major findings from our research into the decision-making patterns of the overburdened AAT in refugee cases. The data, obtained from a freedom of information request, cover 18,196 cases decided by the AAT between January 2015 and December 2019. Our research only looked at asylum seekers who arrived by plane and had access to a review by the AAT. The analysis is part of larger project, run in collaboration with my research student, Keyvan Dorostkar, collating and studying quantitative data at all stages of Australia’s asylum process. How the visa approval and review process works For refugees and asylum seekers applying for protection visas in Australia, the process is lengthy and arduous. The initial assessment of a protection visa application is carried out by the Department of Home Affairs. If this is denied, the options for review then depend on how they arrived in Australia. Those who arrived by plane can seek review at the AAT, where they are given a fresh hearing assessing the merits of their claim for protection. Those who arrived by boat without authorisation can only access a much more limited form of review before the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). If the asylum seeker’s claims fail at the IAA or AAT, they can then seek judicial review at the Federal Circuit Court, but only on the very narrow grounds of there having been some serious legal error. Overall, we found asylum seekers received favourable outcomes before the AAT in just 13% of cases. This includes instances where a visa has been granted or the matter was sent back to the department for reconsideration. In the remaining 87% of cases, the original decision to refuse a visa was affirmed by the AAT or the application was withdrawn. Why legal representation matters Our analysis of the data reveals much more about the factors that tend to lead to a successful or unsuccessful review. One of the most striking findings relates to the potential influence of professional migration advice from a lawyer or migration agent. We found that only 4% of unrepresented applicants were successful at the AAT. This figure rose to 28% when an asylum seeker had legal representation. These statistics suggest the government’s decision to restrict public funding for free legal advice services may be severely disadvantaging applicants who cannot secure representation. This is all the more concerning given our data show that just over half (52%) of all applicants do not have representation when they appear before the AAT. Country of origin plays a huge role in success There are also stark differences in the success rates of applicants from different countries. Of the countries that had 20 or more applications during the period we studied, applicants from Libya (91%), Afghanistan (76%), Ethiopia (61%), stateless individuals (43%), Iraq (53%) and Iran (47%) were the most likely to succeed with their reviews. While some variation is to be expected in these cases, the very high rates of decisions being overturned for certain countries raises concerns about the quality of the initial decisions being made on visas by the Department of Home Affairs. Why is the department getting it wrong 90% of the time for Libyan applicants? Or more than 75% of the time for applicants from Afghanistan? At a time when the AAT is facing a record backlog of applications, it’s vital to understand why this is happening so that some of the pressure might be alleviated. At the other end, the success rates for visa reviews for those from Ireland and Tonga were 0%, followed by Taiwan and South Korea (1%) and Malaysia (3%). The Malaysian applicants are significant as they made up more than one-third of the entire caseload for the period (6,488 applications). The large numbers and low success rates among this group significantly skew the overall data. When the Malaysian applications are removed, the success rate for all asylum seekers increases from 13% to 19%. A parliamentary inquiry found that people smugglers and illegal labour hire companies may be bringing workers into the country on travel visas and then applying for protection visas. This concern was raised particularly with respect to Malaysians. However, there is no strong evidence that backs up claims around the systematic involvement of people smugglers and organised crime. Regardless, the only incentive to put in an unmeritorious asylum claim is that it can buy you more time living and working in Australia. If exploitation is a concern, the best way to ensure the integrity of the system is to reduce delays and invest more resources to boost the capacity for high-quality decision-making at both the department and AAT. Which tribunal member hears the case also matters In our research, we also found significant differences in the success rates for refugee visa reviews, depending which tribunal member hears the case. We only examined members who had decided 50 or more cases to ensure the sample is large enough to be statistically relevant. Two members did not find in favour of a single asylum seeker applicant, and another 16 had approval rates of less than 5%. At the other end, one member decided in favour of the asylum seeker in 86% of cases, while another three members had approval rates over 40%. It is important to caution against drawing inferences as to the cause of this variation. While this could be a result of the individual preferences or biases of tribunal members, it could also be explained by the way cases are allocated. Members generally have expertise in specific types of claims from specific countries, which influences the cases they are assigned. In response to questions about this, the AAT said We will examine these factors in more detail in future research. The AAT is under enormous pressure with its record backlog of cases and associated delays. We believe making data on decision-making patterns publicly available for analysis can lead to better ideas for improving the efficiency and fairness of the process. And this would be in the interest of both refugees and the government. Источник
  19. Напоминаю о Правилах форума и о том, что их нужно соблюдать ВСЕМ ФОРУМЧАНАМ БЕЗ ИСКЛЮЧЕНИЯ. Если кто-то считает, что Правила написаны не для него/не для нее, то не вопрос. Вступать в перепалки не буду, но пожизненный бан поставлю. Так что решайте сами, как у Чернышевского.
  20. In 2019, US denied one in five H-1B petitions with denial rate higher for Indian IT companies: Study WASHINGTON: The US has denied one in every fifth new petitions for the most-sought after H-1B visas in 2019 to individuals with the denial rate higher for Indian IT companies like the TCS and InfosysNSE -2.62 % in comparison to the American firms, according to a study from official figures. The H-1B visa is a non-immigrant visa that allows US companies to employ foreign workers in speciality occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise. The technology companies depend on .. The H-1B visa is a non-immigrant visa that allows US companies to employ foreign workers in speciality occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise. The technology companies depend on it to hire tens of thousands of employees each year from countries like India and China. While the denial rate has dropped slightly to 21 per cent in 2019 from 24 per cent in 2018, the National Foundation for American Policy has said it is much higher for Indian IT companies like the Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and WiproNSE -0.61 % and very low for American companies like Amazon and Google. For instance, the denial rate for the TCS, and Infosys in 2019 was 31 per cent and 35 per cent respectively, whereas for Wipro and very low for American companies like Amazon and Google. For instance, the denial rate for the TCS, and Infosys in 2019 was 31 per cent and 35 per cent respectively, whereas for Wipro was 47 per cent and 37 per cent for Tech Mahindra. On the other hand, the denial rate for the new H-1B petitions in 2019 was just four per cent each for Amazon and Google. The denial rate for Microsoft during the same period was six per cent, and Facebook along with Walmart was was just three per cent each. «In 2020, the Trump administration is expected to introduce a new H-1B regulation that will make it more difficult for employers to hire high-skilled foreign nationals in the United States,» the policy said in a report this week. The issue of H-1B visa has been discussed between India and the US many times in the past. In February, during President Donald Trump’s maiden official visit to India, the issue of H-1B visa was raised and contribution of the Indian professionals in high-tech sector was highlighted. In December last year, during the 2+2 dialogue in Washington, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar stressed on the importance of people-to-people ties, saying they were the defining elements of the Indo-US friendship. Since 2004, the annual limit of 65,000 H-1B petitions and the 20,000 exemption from that limit for individuals with an advanced degree from a US university has been exhausted every fiscal year. The 85,000 new H-1B petitions allowed each year come to only 0.05 per cent of the US labour force of approximately 164 million. In addition to higher denial rates under the Trump administration, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data shows the percentage of completed cases with Requests for Evidence (RFEs) increased from 22.3 per cent in 2015 to 40.2 per cent in 2019. According to the report, new H-1B petitions for the top seven Indian-based companies declined by 64 per cent between fiscal 2015 and fiscal 2019. The seven companies had only 5,428 H-1B petitions for the initial employment approved in fiscal 2019, accounting for six per cent of the 85,000 H-1B petitions for companies (or 0.003 per cent of the US labour force), it said. Denials may have contributed to this decline but the primary reason for the drop in H-1B visas is a choice by companies to build up their domestic workforce in the United States and rely less on visas, the report said. In 2018, there was a sharp 10 per cent decline in the approval of the H-1B visas by the US. The Trump administration has tightened the noose on firms violating H-1B visa rules. President Trump has himself accused many IT companies of abusing the work visas to deny jobs to American workers. Two years ago, Trump signed the ‘Buy American and Hire American’ executive order, which seeks to create higher wages and employment rates for US workers and to protect their economic interests by rigorously enforcing and administering our immigration laws. It directed the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other agencies, to advance policies to help ensure H-1B visas are awarded to the most-skilled or highest-paid beneficiaries. Источник
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  22. The Fiscal Impact of Refugee Resettlement No Free Lunch for Taxpayers Jason Richwine, PhD, is a public policy analyst based in Washington, D.C., and a contributing writer at National Review. Steven A. Camarota is the director of research and Karen Zeigler is a demographer at the Center. Advocates of expanding the number of refugees admitted to the United States have lately portrayed their position as a win-win — refugee resettlement not only assists the refugees themselves, it also allegedly improves our nation’s fiscal health. The fiscal claim is unsupportable. Although refugees from earlier generations were often well educated, today’s refugees have fewer than nine years of schooling on average. Because of their low earning power and immediate access to welfare benefits, recent refugees cost the government substantially more than they contribute in taxes, even over the long term. Our best estimate of the average refugee’s lifetime fiscal cost, expressed as a net present value, is $60,000, with those entering as adults (ages 25 to 64) costing $133,000 each. Perhaps this is a price that the United States should be willing to pay to further its humanitarian goals. However, resettlement in the United States may not be the most cost-effective means of aiding displaced people. Key points: The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine developed a model that estimates the lifetime fiscal impact of new immigrants, counting all taxes paid and services consumed at the federal, state, and local levels. Educational attainment is the most important predictor in the model. Generally speaking, highly educated immigrants will contribute more in taxes than they consume in services, while immigrants with low levels of education will contribute less than they consume. Based on data from the Annual Survey of Refugees, one-third of refugees between the ages of 25 and 64 completed no more than the sixth grade before their arrival in the United States. About 53 percent have less than a high school diploma. Only 18 percent have education beyond high school. When we apply the education levels of refugees to the National Academies’ fiscal model, we find that the average refugee will cost about $36,000 in net present value over his or her lifetime. (Conceptually, «present value» means that all of the lifetime costs have been consolidated into a single upfront payment.) Because the National Academies model is based on all immigrants at each education level, some adjustments are required for refugees who, unlike most immigrants, impose administrative costs for resettlement and can access welfare payments immediately. After these adjustments, our cost estimate rises to $60,000 per refugee. Although the fiscal impact of refugees is negative overall, it differs significantly across age groups. Refugees who enter as adults (age 25 and over) have a large negative impact under every plausible model. Refugees who enter as children may have a positive impact, although this requires optimistic assumptions about mobility. Policymakers need to consider whether resettlement in the United States is the best way to help displaced people. Perhaps overseas assistance would be a more efficient use of limited public resources. Introduction According to the 2016 Annual Survey of Refugees, one in three recent refugees between the ages of 25 and 64 arrived in the United States with no education beyond the sixth grade. Some 53 percent lacked a high school diploma, compared to 7 percent of U.S. natives in the same age range. Similarly, only 18 percent of refugees had a four-year college degree, compared to 34 percent of natives. Despite the disparity, just 7 percent of recent refugees between the ages of 25 and 64 were currently pursuing a degree of any kind. Why is education relevant? Because under the U.S. government’s progressive taxation and spending structure, high-earning Americans tend to receive less in public benefits than they pay in taxes, while lower-earners receive benefits that exceed the taxes they contribute. Given their low education levels, today’s refugees are unlikely to possess the earning power necessary to become net fiscal contributors. This is not a reflection of their character; it is simply a reality of economic life in the United States. In fact, common sense tells us that the public sector would not be struggling every year with budget deficits if even its least-educated citizens were somehow paying their own way.1 Nevertheless, advocates claim that refugees do, indeed, pay their own way. They cite two major studies. The first is a working paper by William Evans and Daniel Fitzgerald finding that each refugee pays an average of $21,000 more in taxes than he or she receives in benefits over the first 20 years in the United States.2 The second is an unpublished (and apparently unfinished) report from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finding that refugees created a net fiscal benefit of $63 billion between 2005 and 2014.3 Both studies have two fundamental problems: First, they exclude major cost categories, and, second, they are based on the experience of older refugees who are altogether different from today’s refugees. As to the first problem, anyone could appear to be a net fiscal contributor if enough costs are excluded. Evans and Fitzgerald count all (or nearly all) taxes paid by refugees, but reduce the services they receive to six social programs — cash welfare, SSI, Social Security, food stamps, Medicare, and Medicaid. All other costs that governments might incur from immigration — housing, infrastructure, education, law enforcement, and so on — do not count. They also fail to adjust for the underreporting of the social programs in Census data. The HHS report is more comprehensive, but it still excludes «congestible» public goods, such as police protection and road maintenance.4 As a result, the HHS study comes to the odd conclusion that almost everyone is a net fiscal contributor — even though the federal government has been running a deficit, and most states are perpetually cash-strapped.5 The second problem is one of interpretation. In order for either study to be relevant to current policy, one must assume that today’s refugees are just like yesterday’s. In the 20th century, the United States took in several groups of higher-skill refugees — for example, Cubans after Castro’s takeover, South Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon, Soviet dissidents in the 1980s, Eastern Europeans in the 1990s, and so on. Today, refugees come mainly from less developed parts of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The difference is evident in the education data published by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in 1995 vs. 2015. As Table 1 indicates, the education level of refugees declined both in absolute terms and relative to natives. For example, the fraction of refugees without a high school diploma increased from 36 percent to 51 percent between 1995 and 2015, while the rate decreased from 20 percent to 13 percent for natives over the same time period.6 t is unrealistic to imagine that the current group of refugees, or those who are likely to be admitted in the near future from places such as the Middle East or Africa, will be as economically productive as the prior group of refugees. For that reason, we project the fiscal impact of refugees based on their own characteristics as new immigrants, not on the characteristics of a different group of refugees from the past. Finally, we emphasize that our analysis is intended to be comprehensive. The popular press often circulates collections of factoids — e.g., how quickly refugees learn English, or how much disposable income they have — that are insufficient to assess the fiscal impact of refugees.7 There is no substitute for an analysis that takes all taxes and spending into account. Results Table 2 has three main rows. The first row, «National Academies’ Model», gives the lifetime fiscal impact of immigrants who have the educational profile of refugees, categorized by their age of entry into the United States. We did not make any adjustments for refugee-specific costs in this row. Because the National Academies created eight separate scenarios using different budgetary assumptions, we report the fiscal impacts that are highest (best for taxpayers) and lowest (worst for taxpayers), as well as the median impact, which is our preferred estimate. A positive number in the table means a gain for taxpayers; a negative number means a loss. The National Academies’ model is based on all types of immigrants, not refugees in particular, so we make additional adjustments in the next two rows. The second row, «Plus Refugee Administrative Costs», adds $9,230 to reflect per-refugee administrative expenditures by the State Department and ORR. The third row, «Plus Five-Year Welfare Costs», adds additional costs based on refugees’ immediate access to welfare programs. (Most other immigrants cannot access programs such as Medicaid and food stamps until they have established five years of legal permanent residency.) As the median estimate in the «Plus Five-Year Welfare Costs» row and «All Ages» column indicates, the average refugee imposes a cost of roughly $60,000 in net present value over his or her lifetime. In the most optimistic scenario, that cost falls to $8,000. In the most pessimistic scenario, it rises to $125,000. No plausible model, not even the National Academies’ best-case scenario, comes close to suggesting that refugees who enter as adults will be net fiscal contributors. Refugee-specific costs add about 22 percent over and above the cost of other immigrants, but low education by itself is enough to push adult refugees’ estimated fiscal impact well into negative territory. The National Academies is more optimistic about the children of low-skill adult immigrants, whom the model assumes will surpass their parents’ education levels. But even with favorable assumptions about refugee children, the overall impact (all age groups combined) is still clearly negative. Detailed Methods The one-sentence version of our method is that we used the National Academies’ fiscal model as a base estimate, and then we made adjustments to reflect added refugee costs within the first five years of their arrival. The base model and the adjustments are reflected in the three major rows of Table 2 above, and we explain them in greater detail below. National Academies’ Model. This model, which includes all taxes and spending at all levels of government, projects immigrant fiscal impacts for eight different budgetary scenarios.8 Each of those scenarios contains estimates for five education categories — less than high school, high school, some college, college, and more than college — and three age-at-arrival levels — 0-24, 25-64, and 65 and over. These estimates are «net present values», meaning future values have been discounted (reduced) to reflect the time value of money. In essence, the entire stream of future costs and benefits has been consolidated into a single upfront payment.9 We use these estimates to assign each recent refugee a lifetime fiscal cost based on his or her entry age and education.10 For example, if a refugee entered at age 39 and has 10 years of education, we assign that refugee the cost of an immigrant who arrived between the ages of 25 and 64 and who has less than a high school diploma. Summing over all refugees produces the results in the «National Academies’ Model» row in Table 2. Because there are eight budgetary scenarios, we report the high, low, and median fiscal impacts from that set of eight. Information on the age and education of refugees comes from the 2016 Annual Survey of Refugees (ASR). Conducted by ORR, the ASR samples from a cross-section of refugees who arrived between 2011 and 2015, and it covers the period of refugee resettlement before the restrictions imposed by the Trump administration.11 It is the first version of the ASR for which the microdata are available to researchers. Although the ASR provides a valuable set of data, it does have two significant limitations. First, 23 percent of recent refugees speak languages so obscure that none of the 16 foreign-language versions of the interview were suitable for them.12 Because speakers of obscure languages tend to come from remote areas, and because secondary schools usually offer instruction in a more popular language, most of the excluded refugees must have arrived with education levels well below the average of the 77 percent who were covered. The survey designers attempted to adjust for this problem using the sampling weight, but missing such a large and non-random subset of the population could reduce the sample’s precision. A second limitation of the ASR is that responses to the education questions do not map neatly on to the five education categories used by the National Academies. Table 3 below explains how we derived the familiar five education categories from the ASR questions on the highest degree obtained and years spent in school. Refugee Administrative Costs. According to previous CIS research, refugee resettlement costs the State Department $4,433 per refugee, while ORR pays $4,797 per refugee, for a total of $9,230.13 The «Plus Administrative Costs» row in Table 2 displays the sum of the $9,230 value and the estimates from the «National Academies’ Model» row. Because administrative costs occur at arrival, no time discounting is necessary. Five-Year Welfare Costs. Although refugees may differ in several ways from the average immigrant modeled by the National Academies, we focus on the clearest legal difference — namely, that refugees are immediately eligible for federal welfare programs, while most other immigrants must be legal permanent residents for five years before accessing benefits. The «Plus Five-Year Welfare Costs» row in Table 2 includes the added cost of Medicaid, cash assistance, food stamps, and housing benefits that refugees consume in excess of what the average immigrant consumes within the first five years. Refugees may continue to consume more welfare dollars than the average immigrant in their age and education group beyond the first five years, but we do not attempt to estimate that difference due to data limitations. To estimate five-year welfare costs, we first identify «high-refugee countries», meaning places that send primarily refugees to the United States rather than other types of immigrants. These countries are Bhutan, Burma, Congo/Zaire, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea, which accounted for 86 percent of all refugees between 2010 and 2015.14 We use the 2013-2017 American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate the cost of food stamps, cash assistance, and Medicaid among immigrants from these countries who arrived in the prior five years.15 Because the ACS lacks information on housing benefits, we use a combined three-year sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to identify those in public or rent-subsidized housing. Following the National Academies example, we adjust for undercount of welfare expenditures in Census surveys by adjusting the totals to match administrative data.16 To ensure that we are capturing only added costs associated with refugee status, we subtract the welfare costs associated with all recent immigrants from the costs associated with immigrants from the high-refugee counties.17 We sum these excess costs over five years of welfare eligibility, discounting at 3 percent in accordance with the National Academies. The net present value of the five-year welfare costs, broken down by age and education, are displayed in Table 4. Because so few refugees are elderly — only about 2.5 percent of refugees in the ASR were 65 or older upon arrival — our sample of age-65-plus immigrants from high-refugee countries in the ACS was too small to divide by education. We instead assigned the age-65-plus refugees the average cost of all education levels within their age group. Conclusion There is a tendency for partisans on both sides of the immigration debate to believe that their values are always reflected in economic data. For example, advocates have asserted that accepting refugees is not only a moral imperative but also a fiscal boon. Similarly, when concerns arise about the cultural compatibility of refugees with American communities, opponents insist the economic cost must be enormous. In reality, the fiscal impact of refugee resettlement is just one aspect of a more complex issue involving economic, social, and political considerations. The purpose of this report is not to argue that all refugee resettlement is wrong, but rather to remind policymakers that there are costs associated with the program. Specifically, we find that the average refugee will cost around $60,000 in net present value over his or her lifetime, with adult refugees costing upwards of $133,000. These costs are due mainly to the low levels of education possessed by refugees upon their arrival. Most refugees admitted to the United States have «no immediate medical, social, or security concerns which would merit expedited processing.»18 Given the costs, it may be possible to help a greater number of displaced people overseas rather than paying to settle them here. Overseas assistance could allow some refugees to eventually resettle in countries where they have stronger cultural or historical ties than they do with the United States.19 In addition, many refugees are in temporary camps near their homes. Assisting host governments, NGOs, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees with supporting these individuals until they can return home is another way the United States may be able to more effectively leverage its resources. End Notes 1 Outside of a U.S. context, most media outlets seem to understand that low-skill migrants strain government resources. For example, the New York Times uncritically cited the «dire» economic consequences predicted by Mexican officials if their country became the last resort for refugees and asylees. (Michael D. Shear and Azam Ahmed, «Mexico and the U.S. Have Made Progress Toward Averting Tariffs», The New York Times, June 6, 2019.) Yet the Times also trumpeted the HHS study discussed below claiming refugees are net fiscal contributors in the United States. («Rejected Report Shows Revenue Brought In by Refugees», The New York Times, September 19, 2017.) 2 William N. Evans and Daniel Fitzgerald, «The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States: Evidence from the ACS», NBER Working Paper No. 23498, June 2017. 3 «The Fiscal Costs of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program at the Federal, State, and Local Levels, from 2005-2014», unfinished draft, Department of Health and Human Services, July 29, 2017. 4 Excluding public goods is sensible when considering the fiscal impact of adding a few refugees, but adding large numbers of people creates new costs for services such as road maintenance and law enforcement, particularly in small towns with high concentrations of newcomers. 5 In fairness to the author (or authors) of the HHS study, revisions may have been intended for a final version that was never completed. 6 Note that we use 2015 in Table 1 rather than 2016. The refugee survey was revamped in 2016, breaking comparability with past years. («Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2016», Office of Refugee Resettlement, p. 70.) Also note the age range of 16 and older – it is the only age range for which ORR published information on education before 2016. 7 See, for example, «From Struggle to Resilience: The Economic Impact of Refugees in America», New American Economy, June 19, 2017. 8 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie, Eds., Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2017, Table 8-12. 9 The National Academies used a 3 percent «discount rate» to calculate present values. Applying a 3 percent discount rate converts the value of $103 paid next year to $103/(1 + 0.03) = $100 today. Similarly, $103 paid two years from now has a present value of $103/(1 + 0.03)2 = $97.09 today. Discounting is simply a means of making costs comparable when they occur at different points in time. Without discounting, the total dollars spent on refugees over their lifetimes will obviously be greater than the present value. For example, in the calculation above, $103 is to be paid next year, and another $103 is to be paid the year after that. By discounting, we can see that stream of payments is equal to a single upfront payment of $100 + $97.09 = $197.09. The actual outlays, of course, will still be $103 + $103 = $206 over two years. 10 In the 25-64 and 65-plus age columns, education refers to the education level of the immigrants themselves. In the 0-24 age column, however, some new immigrants are still in school, so education refers to the education of the immigrants’ parents. The National Academies generally expects the education of a child immigrant to be higher than the level of his or her parents. That assumption of educational gains allows the projected fiscal impact of young immigrants to be positive in some scenarios even when their parents do not have high school diplomas. It is reasonable to expect immigrants who arrive before their late teenage years to continue their education upon arrival. (Indeed, the National Academies modeled educational improvement by selecting immigrants who were between the ages of 10 and 16 and comparing their education 15 years later with the education of their parents.) It is less reasonable, however, to assume that immigrants who arrive between the ages of 19 and 24 will make large educational gains. About 13 percent of refugees ages 0 to 24 in the ASR are immigrants whom we call «independent youths» — between the ages of 19 and 24, not currently in school, and either head of their own household or the spouse of a household head. The National Academies overstates the fiscal impact of these independent youths by assuming educational gains that are not realistic given their age and life circumstances. For the analysis in this report, we considered an adjustment that would shift independent youths into the age 25-64 column for cost purposes. However, we felt that would be an over-correction, as independent youths do at least have more working years ahead of them than their counterparts in the 25-64 column. 11 The Trump administration has lowered the annual number of refugees resettled in the United States from 85,000 in FY 2016 to 30,000 in FY 2019. The cap for FY 2020 has been set at 18,000. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, «Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S.», Pew Research Center, October 7, 2019. In addition, the White House is setting more of its own priorities rather than relying on the UN when selecting which refugees to resettle. This year, religious minorities and Iraqis who assisted the U.S. military have a high preference. See Nayla Rush, «The Trump Administration’s Long Overdue Revision of the Refugee Resettlement Program», Center for Immigration Studies, September 30, 2019. 12 One could hardly accuse the ASR designers of being inattentive to translation needs. Included among the 16 foreign-language versions of the survey were Sgaw Karen, Tedim, Tigrinya, Lai, Kinyarwanda, and Chaldean — dialects that are, of course, rarely heard in the United States. Attempting to cover the remaining 191 languages spoken by refugees would have been cost-prohibitive. (Timothy Triplett and Carolyn Vilter, «2016 ASR Annual Survey of Refugees Data File User’s Guide: A Technical Research Manual», Department of Health and Human Services, July 2018, p. 8.) 13 Steven Camarota, «The High Cost of Resettling Middle Eastern Refugees», Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, November 4, 2015, Table 1. 14 «Yearbook of Immigration Statistics», Department of Homeland Security, years 2012 and 2015, Table 14. 15 Medicaid costs per individual enrollee reflect age and disability status as reported in the ACS. «Medicaid Spending Per Enrollee (Full or Partial Benefit): FY2014», Kaiser Family Foundation, undated. 16 We match total expenditures found in the «Historical Tables» published by the Office of Management and Budget. 17 One may wonder how recent immigrants who are not refugees can consume welfare, given the five-year residency requirement. There are other special categories of immigrants — asylees, spouses eligible for expedited naturalization, children in certain states, etc. — who are also exempted from the five-year rule. In addition, food stamps and housing subsidies are household-level variables that may be received by an eligible resident even when the household head is ineligible. Finally, some immigrants may simply misreport their year of arrival or their welfare use. 18 Nayla Rush, «For Most Refugees, Resettlement Is Not a Matter of Life and Death», Center for Immigration Studies, July 25, 2018. 19 Burma’s Rohingya people, who are Muslims from a predominantly Buddhist country, have resettled in Muslim Bangladesh. Bantu tribesmen, whose ancestors were brought to Somalia by Arab slave traders, have resettled in parts of their tribal homeland in Tanzania and Mozambique. DHS lifts H-2B seasonal worker visa cap by 35,000, ties it to measures tackling abuse The Department of Homeland Security on Thursday announced that it is lifting the H-2B visa cap for seasonal guest workers by 35,000 — coupling the move with a series of measures to tackle fraud and abuse in the system. “This year’s supplemental allocation was determined after extensive consultation with stakeholders—including members of Congress and the Department of Labor—and is intended to strike a careful balance that benefits American businesses and American workers,” DHS said in a statement. The number of H-2B visas, which gives temporary legal status to non-agricultural seasonal workers in areas such as landscaping and service-industry jobs in restaurants and hotels, is capped at 66,000 a year by Congress. Congress has given DHS the authority to raise that cap by 64,000 visas a year. Last year the administration raised it by 30,000. The 35,000 number is lower than the full cap, and lower than initial reports that had tagged the increase at 45,000. Immigration hawks have long opposed increases in H-2B visas, while business groups have said they are essential in a tight labor market. On the Hill, raising the cap has seen both bipartisan support and opposition. Groups of Republicans and Democrats have written to the administration on both sides of the issue. “These realities of the H-2B program, as it operates today, incentivize unscrupulous employers to hire H-2B workers instead of American workers and create poor working conditions for immigrant workers and American workers alike,” a letter by Sens. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa., Tom Cotton. R-Ark., Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., and Richard Durbin, D-Ill., said in January. “Therefore, absent significant regulatory and legislative reforms to the program, we do not believe that an increase in the number of H-2B visas is in the interests of either American workers or H-2B visa holders.» DHS Acting Secretary Chad Wolf was urged by lawmakers last month to increase the cap. “I’ve got a whole bunch of small businesses in New Hampshire who aren’t going to be able to do their business this summer if they don’t have those workers,” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., said. “If that stretches out into June or July, before those actual releases come, that’s too late for the season and so trying to be able to get those done faster is better than slowly trying to be able to piece those out,” said Sen. James Lankford, R-Okla. DHS is responding to some of the concerns about the program by coupling the increase with measures to fight fraud and abuse in the system. Those measures include requiring matching start dates on a petition and the employer’s needed start date, greater collaboration with the Labor Department on increased site visits, and limiting supplemental visas to returning workers who have proven they can follow immigration law. But the reforms were not enough to spare the move from criticism from groups that advocate for lower levels of overall immigration. «The H-2B visa is a flawed program that depresses wages and eliminates job opportunities for American workers,» Dan Stein, president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), said in a statement. «In our view, labor market dynamics do not justify an increase that is 5,000 more than last year. Congress must quit offloading this politically unpopular decision to bring in more wage-impacting foreign workers.» Notably, DHS is also allocating 10,000 visas for nationals from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, in support of efforts in helping the U.S. bring down illegal immigration from their countries. The majority of visas normally go to Mexican workers. The visas will be made available in two batches: 20,000 starting April 1, and a second batch starting May 15. Источник
  23. Каждый выбирает свой путь и свою жизнь. Ну и каждый несет ответственность за свой выбор.
  24. Здравствуйте. Я сильно сомневаюсь, что у Вас получиться получить статус беженца. Мои сомнения основано на многих моментах, в т.ч. и на том, что я очень хорошо знаю, что В НКАО происходило (когда и как). И как обстоять дела сейчас. Но все вопросы на данную тематику рассматриваются в ином разделе настоящего форума.
  25. "Звезда в шоке" от такой "экономии" и экономики.
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