British Lawyer

Из Варшавы ответ может поступить с задержкой в 1 месяц. Боритесь, давите на них.

Отличные новости. У меня по беларуссии стабильно сроки рассмотрения заявления клиентов от 7 до 10 дней. Поздравляю !

Пожалуйста.

Приветствую. Вы все сделали сами и теперь остается только ждать ответа. Насчет maintenance похоже, что Вы правы, если действительно спонсор поставил галочки в сертификате. Насчет TB. Не понятно, по какой визе Вы были в UK 11 месяцев до этого.

Приветствую, Наличие жилья не дает права иммигрировать в Великобританию. А вот наличие хотя бы £200 000 после продажи жилья - да: <noindex>http://www.legalcentre.org/TIER1-Predprinimatel.html</noindex>

Если у него Permanent Residence Card - тогда это сильно упрощает подачу заявления. Если нет - тогда не упрощает ни как.

Не сможете, т.к. UK BA выдает документы обычно на фамилию по паспорту. И сейчас выдают пластиковые карточки во сремя продления, на 5 лет.

Приветствую, Итак: Passport Information - о муже или мои данные , все же раздел EEA National - обычно EEA National Do you have a valid residency card or visa for an EEA member country? - Это о Вас И еще прочитала, что его финансовые документы должны быть "не старше" 28 дней на момент подачи документов в визовый центр. Правда ли это? - Это из UK Immigration Law. Для заявлений внутри UK документы по EU делам должны быть не старше 6 недель. То есть цифра, как ни странно, приближена к действительности и лучшее ее придерживаться. Спасибо огромное, за то, что уделяете время для чтения моих стенаний

Обычно не спрашивают, если ответ на вопрос на сколько Вы прилетели их удовлетворяет.

Привет, Обычно нет, не влияет.

Наверное уже под сотню моих клиентов сдали B1от Trinity College. Простое собеседование в течение 10 минут. Проваливших тест не было.

Не используйте файлики. Они просто бесят офицеров. Я на заре своей практики много - много лет назад был практикантом-юристом на суде в Бирмингеме. Так вот там адвокат принес дело в файликах, судья остановила суд и сделала тому адвокату замечание, судье реально было неудобно вытаскивать и засовывать обратно документы в эти файлики. Подаю заявления клиентов в личном визите в PEO UK BA 2-3 раза в неделю уже много лет. Регулярно общаюсь со знакомыми case workers кто переодически вспоминает очередное заявление с хх количеством файликов. Сам так же регулярно подаю почтовые заявления в UK BA. Скрепляю документы офисными зажимами или степлером. Все документы разложены по порядки и секции помечены stick it notes. Все.

Отличные новости. Поздравляю.

Игорь, На основании Regulations "ребенком" считается лицо до 21 года или старшее при условии, что доказывается зависимость. У меня в практике был "ребенок" с Украины 30 лет от роду.

Я ответил на Ваше сообщение в привате.

Пожалуйста.

Сейчас таких выписок большинство - распечатывают в банке и ставят штампы.

Recent case-law, part 3 •R (on the application of Bah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00518 (IAC) Dismissal of a judicial review against the decision to grant Discretionary Leave to Remain instead of Indefinite Leave to Remain to an applicant relying on a letter received from the Home Office notifying that her case would be considered under the legacy programme. It was held that the letter received by the applicant did not make a clear, unambiguous promise that her case would be reviewed by July 2011 or 20 July 2011. The case therefore fell within the generality of cases dismissed in R (Geraldo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 2763 (Admin). The language employed in the letter was not accepted as evidencing a clear, unambiguous promise; the variations of wording in the general letters sent to applicants did not have significance; and whilst R (Kadyamarunga) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 301 (Admin) could be distinguished on its from Geraldo, where there is conflict, Geraldo is to be preferred. Though the claim failed on the above question, the submissions on the other points of dispute were set out in the judgment at the request of the parties and the Judge offered observations on these (obiter). The Judge considered that a promise to review an applicant’s case by July 2011 would not provide a basis for concluding that a promise was made to review the case by 20 July 2011, the date of the policy change. The opinion expressed by John Vine that applicants would have a reasonable expectation that their case would be considered by July 2011 is not binding on the Court and cannot be reconciled with Geraldo. The applicant would not have a legitimate expectation that the exceptions in paragraph 4.2 of the Discretionary Leave Policy version 6 in place from 24 July 2013 applied to her case and Indefinite Leave to Remain granted as she had not received a clear, unambiguous promise that her case would be dealt with by 20 July 2011. It was rejected in Geraldo that there were or should be other exceptions. It was also stated in Geraldo that there was no evidence before the Court to support the proposition that there was a general undertaking given to deal with legacy or other cases differently from the normal policy guidance. Finally, whilst the Secretary of State has a residual discretion to depart from policy in ‘compelling’ exceptional circumstances, similar arguments based on fairness were rejected in Geraldo. •MC (Essa principles recast) Portugal [2015] UKUT 00520 (IAC) 1. Essa rehabilitation principles are specific to decisions taken on public policy, public security and public health grounds under regulation 21 of the 2006 EEA Regulations. 2. It is only if the personal conduct of the person concerned is found to represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (regulation 21(5)©) that it becomes relevant to consider whether the decision is proportionate taking into account all the considerations identified in regulation 21(5)-(6). 3. There is no specific reference in the expulsion provisions of either Directive 2004/38/EC or the 2006 EEA Regulations to rehabilitation, but it has been seen by the Court of Justice as an aspect of integration, which is one of the factors referred to in Article 28(1) and regulation 21(6) (Essa (2013) at [23]). 4. Rehabilitation is not an issue to be addressed in every EEA deportation or removal decision taken under regulation 21; it will not be relevant, for example, if rehabilitation has already been completed (Essa (2013) at [32]-[33]). 5. Reference to prospects of rehabilitation concerns reasonable prospects of a person ceasing to commit crime (Essa (2013) at [35]), not the mere possibility of rehabilitation. Mere capability of rehabilitation is not to be equated with reasonable prospect of rehabilitation. 6. Where relevant (see (4) above) such prospects are a factor to be taken into account in the proportionality assessment required by regulation 21(5) and (6) ((Dumliauskas [41]). 7. Such prospects are to be taken into account even if not raised by the offender (Dumliauskas [52]). 8. Gauging such prospects requires assessing the relative prospects of rehabilitation in the host Member State as compared with those in the Member State of origin, but, in the absence of evidence, it is not to be assumed that prospects are materially different in that other Member State (Dumliauskas [46], [52]-[53] and [59]). 9. Matters that are relevant when examining the prospects of the rehabilitation of offenders include family ties and responsibilities, accommodation, education, training, employment, active membership of a community and the like (Essa (2013) at [34]). However, lack of access to a Probation Officer or equivalent in the other Member State should not, in general, preclude deportation (Dumliauskas [55]) 10. In the absence of integration and a right of permanent residence, the future prospects of integration cannot be a weighty factor (Dumliauskas [44] and [54]). Even when such prospects have significant weight they are not a trump card, as what the Directive and the 2006 EEA Regulations require is a wide-ranging holistic assessment. Both recognise that the more serious the risk of reoffending, and the offences that a person may commit, the greater the right to interfere with the right of residence (Dumliauskas at [46] and [54]). •Deelah and others (section 117B – ambit) [2015] UKUT 00515 (IAC) (i)Sections 117A and 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 are not confined to an appeal under section 84(1)©. They apply also to appeals brought under section 84(1)(a) and (g). (ii)Section 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, which instruct Judges to attribute “little weight” to the considerations specified therein, do not give rise to a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the independent adjudicative function of the judiciary. (iii)A private life “established”, in the wording and in the context of section 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, is not to be construed and confined to the initiation, or creation, of the private life in question and not its continuation or development. (iv) The adjective “precarious” in section 117B(5) of the 2002 Act does not contemplate only, and is not restricted to, temporary admission to the United Kingdom or a grant of leave to remain in a category which permits no expectation of a further grant.

Recent case-law, part 2 •R (on the application of SS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (declaratory orders) IJR [2015] UKUT 00462 (IAC) (i)The Upper Tribunal has a discretion to make a declaration under section 15(1)(d) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. In common with all remedial orders in judicial review proceedings, this lies within the discretion of the Tribunal. (ii)In deciding whether to make a declaration the Tribunal should bear in mind the educative and corrective function of judicial review. Furthermore, where a challenge exposes that a public authority has acted unlawfully, a declaration will normally be appropriate in circumstances where a quashing, mandatory or prohibitory order is an inappropriate form of relief. •R (on the application of Lewis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00482 (IAC) Unsuccessful judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision not to grant leave to remain under paragraph 276ADE Immigration Rules or Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights. The Claimant was a Jamaican national and had lived in the UK for all her adult life, a period of 13 years. Her father was a British citizen, her mother had Indefinite Leave to Remain and her siblings also resided in the UK, all but one holding British citizenship. She spent time with her family every week. The Claimant was educated to Masters degree level, had been employed in the UK, volunteered as a bereavement counsellor and was active in her local church. It was argued she no longer had any ties to Jamaica. The Secretary of State argued that she had spent the first 18 years of her life in Jamaica and had completed primary and secondary education there. The Claimant’s relationship with her parents and siblings did not fall within the meaning of family life under Appendix FM and did not go beyond the normal emotional ties between parents and siblings. Her education and employment in the UK would assist her in establishing herself in Jamaica and her life in the UK was developed in the knowledge that her status was unlawful. It was held that the application related to a disagreement with the assessment of the Secretary of State rather than irrationality or illegality on her part. The case of Ogundimu, which related to a statutory appeal of someone who had lived in the UK since the age of 6 years, could not be relied upon. •R (on the application of Msiza) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00483 (IAC) Claim for Judicial Review against decision to refuse leave to remain under paragraph 276ADE and article 8 European Convention on Human Rights dismissed. The claimant was unrepresented for the hearing and did not attend herself. The case proceeded in her absence. The Court held that there was no unlawfulness in the Secretary of State’s original decision. The Claimant was a South African national and had lived 15 years of her life there. The absence of family members in the country of origin was not determinative. She could reestablish contact with her stepmother once in South Africa and would be capable of living independently. The second decision made by the Secretary of State in response to the grant of permission for judicial review was held to be a continuation of the first decision considering the factors articulated in Hamasour and Nash, but it was also the case that it contained no error of law. •R (on the application of Hussain) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00486 (IAC) Decision of Ockelton, J, Vice President of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in an unsuccessful judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to make a deportation order under s,3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 on the grounds that she deemed it to be conducive to the public good to deport the applicant from the United Kingdom. The Claimant had 29 convictions for 49 known offences. The application of Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00282 was considered. There had been two previous Tribunal judgments in the case, the first Tribunal finding that the Claimant did not have ties to Bangladesh, his country of origin. The Claimant had argued that following Devaseelan, the Judge of the second Tribunal was not entitled to depart from the findings of the first Tribunal. Though no legal error on the part of the second Judge could be argued, it was submitted that the Secretary of State was obliged to rely on the first Tribunal decision as the starting point for her decision. These arguments were rejected. The Devaseelan guidelines are addressed to Judges not the Secretary of State. The starting point is that the earlier judicial determination is not binding on the second Judge whilst it must be taken into account. Devaseelan has effect at the point at which the Judge takes the second decision. The Secretary of State is required to act on a final judicial decision following R v SSHD ex parte Mersin [2000] EWHC 348 (Admin) and other cases. Further, Devaseelan did not deal with the situation where there were two judicial decisions with conflicting conclusions and there was no reason for a third decisionmaker not to treat the older decision as the starting point. The appropriate remedy would have been an appeal of the second Tribunal decision. On the facts of the case, no injustice was caused to the Claimant as the findings of the second Judge were sustainable given the changed position at that time. •R (on the application of Sharma) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00484 (IAC) Unsuccessful judicial review of a decision of the Secretary of State taken in February 2014 to refuse leave to remain on Article 8 ECHR grounds. No unlawfulness was found on public law grounds. It was also held not to be unfair for the Secretary of State not to have served an appealable decision. The legislative regime prior to April 2015 did not confer a right of appeal in the circumstances of the case. The claimant did not fall within the exceptions following the implementation of the Immigration Act 2014 that applied where reconsideration of a case was outstanding. Whilst the respondent’s arguments on what constituted exceptional and compelling circumstances were circular, the claimant’s case did not come close to amounting to such circumstances. The Secretary of State’s delay in decision-making was to be deprecated but did not make her decision unlawful. It was not unfair to require the applicant to make another application and pay a fee for her case to be reconsidered and be granted a right of appeal. The applicant was an overstayer, had come to the UK without expectation of being able to remain and her case had been considered twice by the Secretary of State.

Recent case-law, part 1 •R (on the application of Bilal Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (EEA/s 10 appeal rights: effect) IJR [2015] UKUT 00436 (IAC) (1) The fact that P (who is not an EEA national) has a right of appeal under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 against an EEA decision to refuse P a residence card does not have the effect of precluding the Secretary of State from removing P under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. (2) Section 92(4)( of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as it was before the changes made by the Immigration Act 2014) does not afford P an in-country right of appeal against the section 10 decision, where the issue of whether P is a member of the family of an EEA national is a matter of dispute. (3) The factual issue of whether P is a family member falls to be determined by the First-tier Tribunal on appeal by P against the EEA decision and/or the section 10 decision, whether or not P may by then be outside the United Kingdom. A judicial review by P of the decision to remove and/or the setting of removal directions will not succeed where P’s application is based on marriage to an EEA national, if the Secretary of State reasonably suspects P of being a party to a marriage of convenience. •R (on the application of Myrie) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00464 (IAC) Judgment of Coker, J in a Judicial Review of the Secretary of State’s decision refusing the Claimant’s application for Leave to Remain on the basis of Article 8 ECHR rights to private and family life. This was another case in which the Secretary of State had served two further decisions after permission for judicial was granted with her detailed grounds of defence. The Tribunal found that the two supplementary decision letters were not part of the original decisionmaking process and that the original decision was unlawful for failing to give adequate consideration to the applicant’s family life or the best interests of the children involved. However, instead of quashing the decision (see for example this approach taken by the Judge in R(AB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2015] UKUT 00352 (IAC), case note in the reported determinations of the July 2015 mailing), the Judge held that the two supplementary letters were relevant to the question of remedy which was 2 discretionary in Judicial Review. The Judge found that as the two supplementary decisions considered all the matters that the Secretary of State had not previously addressed and the Claimant’s case had therefore been considered, the Judicial Review must fail. •BM (false passport) DRC [2015] UKUT 00467 (IAC) The mere fact that an asylum claimant utilised a false passport or kindred document in departing the DRC will not without more engage the risk category specified in [119(iv)] of BM and Others (Returnees: Criminal and Non-Criminal) DRC CG [2015] 293 (IAC). The application of this guidance will be dependent upon the fact sensitive context of the individual case. The Tribunal will consider, inter alia, the likely state of knowledge of the DRC authorities pertaining to the person in question. A person claiming to belong to any of the risk categories will not be at risk of persecution unless likely to come to the attention of the DRC authorities. Thus in every case there will be an intense focus on matters such as publicity, individual prominence, possession of a passport, the standard emergency travel document arrangements (where these apply) and how these matters impact on the individual claimant. •Amirteymour and others (EEA appeals; human rights) [2015] UKUT 00466 (IAC) Where no notice under section 120 of the 2002 Act has been served and where no EEA decision to remove has been made, an appellant cannot bring a Human Rights challenge to removal in an appeal under the EEA Regulations. Neither the factual matrix nor the reasoning in JM (Liberia) [2006] EWCA Civ 1402 has any application to appeals of this nature. •Abbasi and another (visits – bereavement – Article 8) [2015] UKUT 00463 (IAC) 1. The refusal of a visa to foreign nationals seeking to enter the United Kingdom for a finite period for the purpose of mourning with family members the recent death of a close relative and visiting the grave of the deceased is capable of constituting a disproportionate interference with the rights of the persons concerned under Article 8 ECHR. 2. The question of whether Article 8 applies and, if so, is breached will depend upon the fact sensitive context of the particular case. 3. The Tribunal should adopt a structured and sequential approach to the Article 8 issues. •Kaur (visit appeals; Article 8) [2015] UKUT 00487 (IAC) 1. In visit appeals the Article 8 decision on an appeal cannot be made in a vacuum. Whilst judges only have jurisdiction to decide whether the decision is unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (or shows unlawful discrimination) (see Mostafa (Article 8 in entry clearance) [2015] UKUT 00112 (IAC) and Adjei (visit visas – Article 8)[2015] UKUT 0261 (IAC)), the starting-point for deciding that must be the state of the evidence about the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of paragraph 41 of the immigration rules. 2. The restriction in visitor cases of grounds of appeal to human rights does not mean that judges are relieved of their ordinary duties of fact-finding or that they must approach these in a qualitatively different way. Where relevant to the Article 8 assessment, disputes as to the facts must be resolved by taking into account the evidence on both sides: see Adjei at [10] bearing in mind that the burden of proof rests on the appellant. 3. Unless an appellant can show that there are individual interests at stake covered by Article 8 “of a particularly pressing nature” so as to give rise to a “strong claim that compelling circumstances may exist to justify the grant of LTE [Leave to Enter] outside the rules”: (see SS (Congo) [2015] EWCA Civ 387 at [40] and [56]) he or she is exceedingly unlikely to succeed. That proposition must also hold good in visitor appeals.

Immigration Digest October 2015 •HC 497 Statement of changes in immigration rules HC 497 was published on 17 September. Briefly, the domestic workers in receipt of a “conclusive grounds” decision that they are victims of slavery or trafficking will be able to apply, within 28 days, for a period of leave of up to six months, with no recourse to public funds. This will allow them to work as a domestic worker. Meanwhile changes are made to the allocation of Tier 2 certificates of sponsorship following the cap’s being reached. These create smaller salary bands and also allow the Secretary of State to reclaim unused certificates of sponsorship and return them to the limit. There are minor changes to the visitor rules affecting applicants from Vietnam and Zimbabwe. •Judicial review The Administrative Court Office issued a new form N463 for applications for urgent consideration in Judicial Review on 04 September 2015. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) has updated forms T480, T481 and T485 for Judicial Reviews lodged with the Upper Tribunal. The forms now direct that failure to provide form T485 to the Upper Tribunal within nine days of lodging the application for judicial review will lead to proceedings being struck out automatically. It seems that the automatic strike out of an application is a disproportionate measure, particularly in the case of litigants in person. •European Union referendum bill: <noindex>http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-1...referendum.html</noindex> •Home Affairs Committee's inquiry on Immigration - skill shortages: <noindex>http://www.parliament.uk/business/committe...kill-shortages/</noindex> •Immigration detention in the UK: an overview, Commons Briefing papers CBP-7294: <noindex>http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/Res...7294#fullreport</noindex> •Ceasing asylum support: instruction: <noindex>https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/...ort-instruction</noindex> •Changes to "User pays" visa application centres from 1 September 2015 From 1 September, the Home Office is "converting" some visa application centres into "User pays" centres. Applicants will pay a £52 fee to use the application centre, in addition to their visa application fee. The affected visa application centres are: •Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia •Jalandhar, India •Osaka, Japan •Jinan, China* •Izmir, Turkey •Rostov, Russia •Dusseldorf, Germany •Zurich, Switzerland •Madrid, Spain •Rome, Italy •Warsaw, Poland *Jinan will convert to a user pays centre on 1 October. The Home office says: "The £52 fee only covers the cost of operating application centres in these locations and ensures that customers do not have to travel long distances, or to another country, to apply for a visa. The fee will apply at all user pays centres and is a reduction from what is currently charged at existing user pays centres in nearly 100 other locations." The fee will apply to all applications submitted and paid for after midnight (UK time) on 1 September. •Tier 1 Entrepreneur Interview questions: <noindex>http://www.legalcentre.org//files/Tier-1-E...r-Interview.pdf</noindex> •Review of Tier 2: analysis of salary thresholds: <noindex>https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/...lary-thresholds</noindex> •According to the UK BA, a foreign company without a physical presence in the UK may still get a Tier 2 Sponsorship License

Приветствую. Вы продолжаете находиться в стране по категории EEA. Те же правила и условия, что если бы Ваш муж не получал бы британского гражданство (т.е. жить с Вами и быть экономически активным). Если на момент получения Вами PR у Вашего мужа будет британское гражданство, то Вы тогда сразу сможете подавать на гражданство, т.е. не нужно будет ждать 12 месяцев после получения PR.

У нас регулярный поток заявлений по EEA Law. Сначала приходит запрос на биометрику в течение 1-3 недель. Потом примерно через месяц приходит CoA.

Пожалуйста.

Возможно, но лучше взять письмо о том, что документы потеряны и что они подтверждают его работу за все х лет.